I found a (small) security issue regarding the login on vCampus.
A few years ago there was an OpenSSL bug, which did kind of the same thing as I'm describing here. The issue was the following:
If a user/pwd combination was incorrect, but the username was an existing user, the timespan between the initiation of the login, and the return error message was different then from a user/pwd combination where the user did not exist. This gave away information about existing usernames. The same (but even more visible) issue is happening on vcampus.
vCampus credentials are made up from two parts, a username and password. While the password is the 'more secure' part of the authentication, it is still a two-part authentication (a specific password for a specific username).
It is important not to give any information away about the combination of the two to 'outsiders'.
There is a little catch tough:
If I login with a non-existing username, like 'foofoo', with a jibbrish password, you are presented with the following message:
Invalid credentials. Be sure to Register if a first time user.
If I login with a known username, and a jibbrish password, you are presented with the following message:
Please check your username or Password and try again.
So, the vCampus software is giving away information about the username-password combination. More precisly, outsiders can check for existing usernames, making a brute force attack far more optimized.
I have no information if there are login-attempts lockouts implemented in the vCampus software, but this could mean that an attacker can collect known usernames, and bruteforce a password in a night.
With all the information available on the internet (google/linkedin/etc) it is easy to find companies and individual users that use PI/vCampus. Therefore it would not be that difficult to create an extended dictionary with possible usernames (and variations) for vCampus to have an highly optimized bruteforce/dictionary attack. Important to note is that usernames are not case sensitive. This increases the chance of getting a positive hit on an existing username by almost 2.
As there is a lot of information available on vCampus, but more importantly: there is a ton of (commercial) software available for download. This could mean that OSIsoftware can be cracked/illegally distributed, and that someone with the account (who is ignorant of the situation) will take the blame.
Example of exploit:
Searching for OSIsoft PI on google.com gives a lot of results. The fourth result is Rhys's company website: http://www.rjksolutionsltd.co.uk/main/. Rhys's company is called 'RJK Solutions'. (the term 'vcampus' is mentioned on this website/forum)
From his company name and information on his website, it is not very difficult to compile a list of possible loginnames (simplified example):
Searching for OSIsoft vcampus on LinkedIn produces a couple of results. The first result being Steve Pilon. Again, it is not difficult to produce a list of possible usernames (simplified):
In these examples, the only way to make it very difficult (or near impossible) for an attacker to use your particulair account, is to choose a very strong password. This only 'protects' for accounts that have that strong password.
Have the authentication error messages give away no information. This means that all security error messages must produce the same message.
Enforce strong passwords.
edit: @Rhys & @Steve: If you mind these examples, please contact me and I'll remove them. It's just to illustrate this case.